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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant Mark A, Schoenfeld appeals from the 
verdict of guilty to a lesser included charge of negli-
gent homicide by jury verdict on a trial for manslaughter 
before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft in the District Court 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. He was sentenced 
by Judge Croft to one year in the County Jail, 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the verdict reversed 
and the case remanded for new trial on the negligent homi-
cide charge only, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant was charged with criminal homir-
cide, a felony in the second degree (manslaughter), 
alleging: 
"That on or about the 29th day of July, 
1974, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the defendant Mark Allen Schoenfeld reck-
lessly or under circumstances not legally 
justifiable or excusable caused the death 
of James Ivan Versluis.11 (R 13) 
The charge was under 76-5-205, Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended, after being reduced at preliminary hearing from 
a charge of murder in the second degree. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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On July 19, 1974, there were two,beer parties 
at The Spruces in Big Cottonwood Canyon. Both the appel-
lant Schoenfeld and the deceased Versluis were in atten-
dance but were not acquainted at the time. Schoenfeld's 
friend and roommate, Austin, was involved in two fights at 
The Spruces. These fights were broken up and Austin took 
his car and left the canyon, leaving Schoenfeld afoot. 
Schoenfeld rode down the canyon with Dee Johnson, who, 
enroute, asked Schoenfeld to perform fellatio on himf 
Schoenfeld refused and became very upset. After arriving 
at the Canyon Inn at the mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon, 
Schoenfeld and Johnson had further words, and Schoenfeld 
left. 
Austin had gone down to the south part of 
Salt Lake valley and had picked up one Guthrie, a mutual 
friend of Austin and Schoenfeld, and had procured a .22 
semi automatic pistol belonging to Schoenfeld and had 
gone back to The Spruces in Guthrie's car with Guthrie 
driving. Finding the party had terminated, they came 
back down the canyon. While enroute Austin fired the 
gun once into the hillside. They picked up Schoenfeld, 
who was hitchhiking on 70th South. Schoenfeld told them 
about being propositioned, and indicated he wanted to 
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go back and fight "that queer." Austin informed Schoenfeld 
he had the gun and gave it to Schoenfeld, who put it under 
his belt in back and pulled his shirt over it. The three 
went back to the Canyon Inn, Schoenfeld walked to the 
middle of the parking lot and indicated to Johnson that 
he wanted to fight. Johnson walked out towards Schoenfeld 
and they both continued north to the roadf with Schoenfeld 
backing and Johnson walking forward. 
In the meantimer the deceased Versluis had knocked 
both Austin and Guthrie down and had chased Austin out of 
the parking lot to 70th South and west along 70th South. 
Schoenfeld had left Johnson with no physical contact between 
the two, and was backing south towards Guthrie's car, which 
Guthrie had already entered, when Versluis, who was 6'3" tall 
and 225 lbs. (R 125) , came running rapidly towards Schoenfeld, 
swinging a belt with a buckle attached over his head. Up 
to this time there had been no contact between Schoenfeld 
and Versluis, either physical or verbal. 
At this point the testimony varies, some witnesses 
saying Schoenfeld said "I've got a gun and I am not fooling." 
Other witnesses, including Ehrler, saying Ehrler shouted 
"He's got a gun." Schoenfeld in his testimony stated while 
Versluis was running towards him swinging the belt, "I've 
got a gun and I'm not fucking around/5 and fired a shot in 
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front of and to the left of Versluis and kept retreating 
to the car. Versluis paused and then charged Schoenfeld 
as Schoenfeld was getting into the car through the passenge-
door, which Guthrie had already opened. Versluis came in 
contact with Schoenfeld and grabbed the gun, Two shots 
were fired~-one entered Versluis1 chest and one his abdo-
men. Guthrie swung the car around and accelerated out of 
the parking lot. Someone opened the driver's door and 
grabbed Guthrie by the hair, a beer bottle was thrown 
into the car through an open window, something struck the 
car on the top causing dents immediately before the two 
shots were heard. 
When Versluis came away from the car, he staggered 
several steps and collapsed. At this time he had the 
gun and the belt in his hands and was holding the gun by 
the barrel. Guthrie drove down 70th South looking for 
Austin, who they didnft find. Schoenfeld stated to Guthrie 
"I think I shot the dude." Guthrie said "We better call 
the police." They proceeded to Guthrie!s apartment and 
immediately called the police who arrived 30-45 minutes 
later. 
The testimony from the Medical Examiner com-
bined with the stipulated testimony from FBI reports show-
ing powder residue on the clothing over both entrance 
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wounds indicate that each was a wound made with the gun > 
in contact with the body of the deceased. 
There is no evidence of any contact, either 
physical or verbal, between Schoenfeld and Versluis until 
the deceased was running towards Schoenfeld swinging a 
belt a very few seconds before the shots which resulted 
in Versluis1 death. 
The jury, while deliberating, sent a written 
question to Judge Croft which the Judge declined to answer. 
After they (the jury) had returned with the verdict on the 
lesser offense (negligent homicide), the Judge made the 
following statement to the jury (see R 371-372): 
111 would like to say to you also that 
I appreciated your thoughtful question. 
I always felt that once we submit a case 
to the jury that the Judge shouldn!t give 
further instruction or review any further 
testimony, and I appreciate the fact that 
the instructions we give you are given in 
language that is legal enough that some-
times judges and lawyers don't always under-
stand it, so I think it was a very thoughtful 
question. Maybe in the future we can use 
language more in lay terms. I don't know, 
but in any event, thank you very much for 
your service again, and now you are excused. 
* * * * * 
"Might be of interest to you (talking 
to counsel in the court), they would like 
to have explained to them in lay language 
the difference between manslaughter and 
negligent homicide." (R 372) 
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POINTS ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION 14 IN 
THAT (A) HE IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY AS TO THE 
LAW IN SUBSECTION (b) OF INSTRUCTION 14, AND (B) THE 
COURT'S INSTRUCTION 14 IN EFFECT CONSTITUTES COMMENTS 
ON THE EVIDENCE IN BOTH SUBPARAGRAPHS (b) AND (c), 
The Court in Instruction 14 (R 53)
 r after pro-
perly defining justifiable homicide, went forward to set 
forth exclusions to the rule, and in doing so, stated 
at subparagraph (b); 
"•..his attempting to commit, his 
committing, or his fleeing after the 
commission, or attempted commission 
of a felony, and under the law it is 
a felony if one uses ""a deadly weapon 
in"threatening to do bodily injury to 
another and accompanies tfTatT threat by 
a show of immediate force or violence^' 
(Emphasis added] 
This is not a correct statement of the law, see 
76-10-501, Utah Code Annotatedf as amended by the laws of 
1973, defining dangerous weapon, including firearms, at 
paragraph (2) of that statute. 76-10-506, Utah Code 
Annotated, as amended by the laws of 1973, reads as fol-
lows : 
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"Threatening with or using dangerous 
weapon in fight or quarrel - Every person 
except those persons described in Section 
76-10-503 who, not in necessary self-defense, 
in the presence of two or more persons 
draws or exhibits any dangerous weapon 
in an angry and threatening manner, or 
unlawfully uses the same in any fight 
or quarrel, is guilty of a class B mis-
demeanor. " 
Section 76-10-503, referred to in the quotation 
above, affects only persons previously convicted of a 
crime of violence, drug addicts, or people who have been 
declared mentally incompetent, none of which apply to the 
appellant herein. 
The writer is fully aware of 76-5-103, Utah Code 
Annotated, as amendedf which, combined under the proper 
findings of fact with 76-5-102, could make appellant's 
acts a felony of the third degree. The Court, by adding 
the underlined portion to the otherwise proper subpara-
graph of Instruction 14, invaded the province of the jury, 
found the facts as he (the Court) saw it, and by doing so, 
effectively said !,I have defined justifiable homicide for 
you, but after reading subparagraph (b) of that Instruc-
tion, there is no way you can consider the question of 
justifiable homicide.ff This clearly violates the mandate 
of 77-31-31, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
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The Court continued to err in invading the pro-
vince of the jury in giving also in Instruction 14 a defi-
nition of "aggressor1* and then going on to state that ra 
person can also be classified as an aggressor if he leaves 
the scene of a quarrel, arms himself, and then returns to 
the scene and renews the quarrel.r It must be remembered 
that there is no possible interpretation of the evidence 
to show any contact with the deceased, either verbal or 
physical, or any quarrel prior to approximately ten sec-
onds before the shots which caused the fatality, The 
deceased was an interloper in a quarrel between appellant 
and Dee Johnson which had already terminated prior to the 
shooting* 
The Court also in Instruction 14, in its last 
paragraph, misstates the law. 
These combinations of errors made it impossible 
for the jury to consider the defense of justifiable homi-
cide. 
Counsel for the appellant took timely and proper 
exception to the errors in Instruction 14 (R 368-369). 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION OF THE EVI-
DENCE WHICH CAN JUSTIFY A FINDING OF NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 
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UNDER ANY VIEW, ALL OF THE EVIDENCE OR ANY PORTION, THE 
ACTS CAUSING THE DEATH HAD TO BE EITHER (A) WILLFUL, WHICH 
WOULD CONSTITUTE MANSLAUGHTER, OR (B) ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE 
IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE GUN, WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE 
EXCUSABLE HOMICIDE, 
The jury apparently found itself on the horns 
of a dilemma, after some hours of deliberation, of being 
unable to reach a verdict of guilty on the charge of man-
slaughter and being unable to acquit on a basis of justi-
fiable homicide in view of'the Court's Instruction 14, dis-
cussed in Point I above, and at that time, through the 
bailiff in charge of them, sent a note to the Court with 
a question indicating they would like to have explained 
to them in lay language the difference between manslaughter 
and negligent homicide, see Judge Croft's remark (R 372). 
The Judge refused to further define or to give further 
instructions (R 371-372)* The complete reading of the 
transcript indicates that there is no possible combination 
of facts under the evidence which constitute negligent 
homicide. The acts of Schoenfeld, combined with the acts 
of Versluis, which resulted in his death had to be either 
willful—that is, intentional pulling of the trigger by 
Schoenfeld, which would be under subsection (b) of Instruc-
tion 12 "causes the death of another under circumstances 
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where the actor reasonably believes the circumstances 
provide a moral or legal justification or extenuation of 
his conduct, although the conduct is not legally justifi-
able or excusable under existing circumstances" or acci-
dental in that the gun discharged twice through the com-
bined efforts of Schoenfeld and Versluis in the struggle 
for the gun, in which case the death would have been excus-
able and not as the result of criminal negligence as defined 
by the Court in Instruction' 17 (R 61). 
. - i 
SUMMARY 
A careful reading of all of the testimony can 
leave one conclusion, and only one--that being that the 
two questions (1) who was the aggressor (as between 
Schoenfeld and Versluis, not between Schoenfeld and 
Johnson, and (2) the question whether Schoenfeld1s acts 
after drawing the gun were (a) justifiable as lawful 
acts in defense of himself, or (b) unlawful acts amount-
ing to a misdemeanor under 76-10-501 and 506, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended by the Laws of Utah 1975, or 
(c) unlciwful acts amounting to a felony under 76-5-102-103, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. These were clearly 
questions of fact for the jury. 
- 10 -
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The Court, by its wording of Instruction 14, 
subparagraphs (b) and (c)f (see Point I supra) , indicates 
that the jury, if it follows the lawf canft consider the 
defense of justifiable homicide although a justifiable 
homicide instruction was given by adding the underlined 
phrase in subparagraph (b) of said Instruction 14 "under 
the law it is a felony if one uses a deadly weapon in 
threatening to do bodily injury to another and accompanies 
that threat by a show of immediate force or violence," 
(R 53). Without giving instructions as to the possible 
misdemeanor as set forth above or the possibility of a 
lawful act as self-defense, thereby effectively removing 
the appellant's justifiable homicide defense. 
The Court compounds the jury's dilemma by defin-
ing aggressor and then adding (upon the requests of both 
the State and the appellant) "a person can also be classi-
fied as an aggressor if he leaves the scene of a quarrel, 
arms himself, and then returns to the scene and renews 
the quarrel." The Court does not instruct on the basis 
of there being more than one quarrel. In the evidence 
before the jury there were as many as four "hassles" 
involved—two up the canyon not involving either Schoenfeld 
or Versluis—two more at the Canyon Inn between Schoenfeld 
- 11 -
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and Johnson, and another in which the deceased Versluis 
knocked down both Austin and Guthrie when Schoenfeld had 
left the scene with Johnson. 
At the risk of being repetitious, I again state 
that there had been no contact or relationship whatsoever 
between Schoenfeld and Versluis. In other words, there 
had been no quarrel with Versluis to renew. 
The Court, in adding the last paragraph, com-
pounds the problem further and. makes it appear as a com-
ment on the facts stating that Schoenfeld was the aggesssor 
and in effect that Versluis had the right to go to any r 
lengths to disarm Schoenfeld and prevent his escape. That 
is not the law in this state since the new Code came into 
effect July 1, 1973. 
With regard to Point II, counsel for the State, 
Mr.Hyde, joined counsel for the defense in his argument 
that under the facts there was no basis for a finding of 
negligent homicide. It is apparent that the jury was 
confused by the Courtfs instructions, as is pointed out 
by their request for clarification of the difference 
between manslaughter and negligent homicide. The Court 
denied them the aid requested, and apparently they had 
been unable to find the elements of manslaughter, and 
under Instruction 14, felt they could not find justifi-
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able homicide and there compromised on the "lesser included 
offense" which could not by any interpretation of the 
evidence have been the crimef if any, committed. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court 
reverse the verdict and judgment and remand the case to 
the trial court for a new trial on the crime of negli-
gent homicide. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HATCH, McRAE & RICHARDSON 
Sumner J, Hatch 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant 
370 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief to Mr. 
Vernon B. Romney, Attorney General of Utah, Attorney for 
Plaintiff-Respondent, Utah State Capitol, Salt Lake City, 
UT 84114, postage prepaid. 
/ A/ 
"Sumner J. Hatch 
/ 
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